

REPORT

ON THE ACTIVITY OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE
OF THE RED CROSS
FOR THE INDEMNIFICATION
OF FORMER ALLIED PRISONERS
OF WAR IN JAPANESE HANDS

*Article 16 of the Peace Treaty
of 8 September 1951
between the Allied Powers and Japan*



GENEVA, 1971



I. INTRODUCTION

Article 16 of the Peace Treaty between Japan and the Allied Powers, signed on 8 September 1951 in San Francisco, provided as follows:

“ As an expression of its desire to indemnify those members of the armed forces of the Allied Powers who suffered undue hardships while prisoners of war of Japan, Japan will transfer its assets and those of its nationals in countries which were neutral during the war, or which were at war with any of the Allied Powers, or, at its option, the equivalent of such assets, to the International Committee of the Red Cross which shall liquidate such assets and distribute the resultant fund to appropriate national agencies, for the benefit of former prisoners of war and their families on such basis as it may determine to be equitable. The categories of assets described in Article 14 (a) 2 (II) (ii) through (v) ¹ of the present Treaty shall be excepted from transfer, as well as assets of Japanese natural persons not residents of Japan on the first coming into force of the Treaty. It is equally understood that the transfer provision of this Article has no application to the 19,770 shares in the Bank for International Settlements presently owned by Japanese financial institutions.”

¹ See Annex I.

The Peace Treaty was signed by the representatives of Japan and of the following Powers:

Argentina	Ethiopia	New Zealand
Australia	France	Nicaragua
Belgium	Greece	Norway
Bolivia	Guatemala	Pakistan
Brazil	Haiti	Panama
Cambodia	Honduras	Paraguay
Canada	Indonesia	Peru
Ceylon	Iran	Philippines
Chile	Iraq	Saudi Arabia
Colombia	Laos	South Africa
Costa Rica	Lebanon	Turkey
Cuba	Liberia	United Kingdom
Dominican Republic	Luxembourg	United States
Ecuador	Mexico	Uruguay
Egypt	Netherlands	Venezuela
El Salvador		Vietnam

Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the USSR, represented at the Conference, did not sign the Treaty. Burma, India and Yugoslavia, invited, were not represented. China, already divided, was not invited.

In a statement to the Conference, the United States waived its claim to the benefit due to it under the terms of Article 16. The Treaty became effective on 28 April 1952.

Having been invited to attend the Conference for the peace settlement with Japan, the International Committee of the Red Cross¹ sent to San Francisco a mission led by the President, Mr. Paul Ruegger. Although the Conference proceeded in such a way that it was impossible to make any amendment to the draft text submitted to the Powers represented, Mr. Ruegger was able to assure himself of the free consent of the Japanese to the application of Article 16

¹ Hereinafter referred to by its initials, ICRC.

and to obtain the assurance that the other problems arising from the application of that Article could be solved by later talks with the Powers concerned.

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK

Article 16 is an integral part of an international treaty which, by definition, binds the Powers Parties, but also provides for a mandate given to the ICRC, viz., to a non-governmental humanitarian institution which is not Party to the Treaty.

This exceptional legal situation is not however without a precedent. It is in fact known that the Geneva Committee's activity of assistance was recognized successively by the Diplomatic Conferences of 1864, 1904, 1929 and 1949. The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 relative to the protection of war victims have, in addition, entrusted it with a certain number of responsibilities, particularly as regards supervision (Art. 126, Convention III; art. 143, Convention IV). The ICRC is thus considered as being an implied subject of international law, which also explains the tasks which were also entrusted to it at San Francisco.

First of all, it will be noted that Article 16 demanded of Japan an obligation combined with a choice. It had to "transfer its assets and those of its nationals in countries which were neutral during the war, or which were at war with any of the Allied Powers, or, at its option, the equivalent of such assets to the International Committee of the Red Cross." Japan had thus an obligation both towards the other Contracting Parties, namely the Allied Powers, and the ICRC, charged with liquidating the assets and distributing the resultant fund "to appropriate national agencies for the benefit of former prisoners of war and their families on such basis as it may determine to be equitable."

Article 16 thus set up an institutional arrangement implying:

- Japan's initial obligation as provider of the funds,
- the mandate given to the ICRC to undertake the distribution of these funds,
- the freedom left to it to determine the basis of equitable distribution,

- the designation of former prisoners of war and their families as beneficiaries,
- the intermediary of “ appropriate national agencies ” which decide on the role of the Allied Powers.

These High Contracting Parties were the principal agents of these distribution operations. It was in fact for the States to take the initial measures enabling the distribution to be effected as laid down. It was also for them to ensure the respecting of the provisions of Article 16 at all stages of liquidation and distribution. They should also be in a position to provide the ICRC with information necessary for it to accomplish its task on the basis of concrete facts.

In order to co-ordinate their action and facilitate co-operation with the ICRC, the governments of the beneficiary Powers set up a Working Party with headquarters in London. The Foreign Office of the United Kingdom convenes the members and ensures the functioning of the secretariat for its sessions. This Working Party is not empowered to engage the Powers it represents, but merely makes recommendations which have to be ratified before being put into effect. Such procedure involved delays which could sometimes be considerable.

The beneficiary Powers also appointed a more restricted Executive Committee on which only three Powers are represented, namely the Netherlands, Pakistan and the United Kingdom. Its main task was to bring the requisite technical discussions between Japan and the other governments concerned to a satisfactory conclusion so as to make available to the ICRC the assets as mentioned in Article 16.

It was also for the beneficiary Powers to nominate “ the appropriate national agencies ” to whom the ICRC was to entrust the distribution of funds for former allied prisoners of war or their families. These national agencies were designated by each of the governments concerned to draw up lists of persons eligible, fulfilling the conditions for qualification as laid down in Article 16 or as defined at meetings of the Working Party.

Several governments delayed in sending the ICRC the names of the national agencies responsible, which obliged it to give them several reminders. It also happened that the national agency was

changed during the preliminary operations of deciding on the actual number of beneficiaries.

The agencies appointed were as follows:

Australia	Australian Government
Belgium	Belgian Red Cross
Cambodia	Cambodian Red Cross
Canada	Canadian Commission for War Damage Claims
Chile	Chilean Government
France	Ministry for Ex-Servicemen and War Victims
Netherlands	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
New Zealand	New Zealand Government
Norway	Ministry of Social Welfare
Pakistan	Adjutant-General of the Army
Philippines	Philippine Red Cross
Syria	Syrian Red Crescent
United Kingdom	Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance
Vietnam	Ministry of Defence

As the other factor in the arrangement, the ICRC was represented at meetings of the Working Party or of the Executive Committee whenever questions of general interest were raised, or there were suggestions to be made to the beneficiary Powers or instructions to be asked of them.

As a private institution with a strictly humanitarian role, the International Committee was resolved to put its mandate into execution on behalf of former prisoners of war designated to benefit from these operations of indemnification.

The responsibilities thus devolving upon it in the liquidation and administration of considerable assets, and in their distribution to a large number of nationals of several different countries led it to set up a vigilance committee consisting of the following:

Chairman: Mr. Paul Carry, Doctor of Laws, Barrister, Professor of the Faculty of Law at Geneva University, honorary member of the ICRC.

Members: Mr. Ernest R. Froehlich, Doctor of Laws, President of the Foundation for the Organization of Red Cross Transport.
Mr. Eugène Hasler, Doctor of Laws, former Judge on the Swiss Federal High Court.
Mr. Frédéric Schnorf, former Director-General of the Swiss National Bank.
Mr. Hans Bachmann, Doctor of Laws, Member of the ICRC.

III. COLLECTION OF FUNDS

Compensation as laid down in Article 16 of the Peace Treaty of San Francisco involved the sale of certain assets for distribution among an undetermined number of beneficiaries. It was therefore necessary above all to know the amount of funds to be distributed.

1. Basic criterion

The Powers signatories to the Treaty have given a restrictive description of the funds earmarked for the former prisoners of war, and their families, namely assets of Japan or of its nationals in countries which remained neutral during the war, or were at war with at least one of the Allied Powers. Such assets or their equivalent could be transferred at the discretion of the Japanese Government.

In the event of Japan's opting for the second solution, the ICRC made a reservation with a view to obtaining compensation from the Japanese Government for private assets coming within the provisions of Article 16. In addition, it made it known that it was not in a position to undertake valuation and transfer operations, nor competent to conduct political negotiations which might prove necessary for the conduct of these operations of a commercial character. In fact the funds were in countries which had been neutral during the course of the Second World War, or enemies of the Allied Powers, that is to say in countries which were not Parties to the Peace Treaty of San Francisco, and consequently in no way bound to the provisions of Article 16.

The checking of the assets involved, their realization and their transfer to the ICRC were therefore the responsibility of the Powers whose nationals were designated as beneficiaries of the distribution. The International Committee could only give support to their representations with a view to safeguarding the beneficiaries' interests.

Furthermore, the former prisoners of war and their families were dispersed in a large number of countries which moreover were not the same as those from which the funds emanated. The ICRC therefore asked that these assets be realized and handed over to it in freely convertible currency.

2. Application of the basic criterion

The governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom set about locating and evaluating the assets. They observed that the assets were to be found in Afghanistan, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and Thailand.

First checking enabled only very approximate estimates to be made of the amount of funds available under Article 16. The Powers holding them in fact were reluctant to give the required information, especially Switzerland where about half the funds had been placed, mostly representing private assets covered by banking secrecy. Estimates varied widely: the highest being thrice the lowest.

In addition, the countries where the assets were to be found themselves made counter-claims against Japan as war damages they considered to be due to them. They also maintained that these claims should be met before any assignment be made of the assets which they held. Whilst waiting to allow these demands, the Japanese funds mentioned in Article 16 were blocked, the net amount remaining unknown.

Liquidation as laid down in the San Francisco Treaty encountered yet another obstacle in the fact that Japanese public assets in the neutral or enemy countries of the Allied Powers had been placed under the control of the four Great Powers, namely Great Britain, the USA, the USSR and China. Two of these, however, were not signatories to the Peace Treaty of San Francisco.

Japan, for its part, wanted to avoid having to pay twice: in other words, it did not wish to assign these assets to States holding them and submitting claims under war damages, and also transfer the equivalent amount of these same assets as compensation to former Allied Powers. Finally, like many other countries at that time, Japan was short of foreign currency which did not facilitate the making of the necessary payments.

3. Liquidation of assets

After many representations and a succession of negotiations, resulting in considerable delays, the first funds paid to the ICRC were those representing Japanese funds in Thailand.

The United States and the United Kingdom established, and this was accepted by the other beneficiary Powers, that the purchase price of the Thailand Burma railway built by interned civilians and Allied prisoners of war in Japanese hands should not be included in the estimate of assets coming within the provisions of Article 16. The United Kingdom which was thus to receive £355,000 agreed to distribute this amount to persons whom Japan had forced to take part in the building of the railway. The total of Japanese assets in Thailand was fixed at \$2,500,000.

The other beneficiary Powers having made known their agreement to this amount, Thailand paid in to the ICRC in September 1953, half in US dollars and the other half in sterling:

£446,428/11/5 and
\$1,250,000.

The results of negotiations with the other countries holding Japanese assets took somewhat longer so that Japan was asked to remit their equivalent to the ICRC. The representatives of several governments of the beneficiary Powers approached it in this sense and the International Committee itself intervened in Tokyo where Mr. E. R. Froelich, member of the Vigilance Council, went to attempt to convince the Japanese authorities accordingly.

In autumn 1954, the Executive Committee finally sent to Tokyo a delegation which on 30 November signed an agreement with the

Japanese Government. Under that agreement the Japanese authorities undertook to pay the sum of £4,500,000 to the ICRC. The agreement duly received the approval of the beneficiary Powers.

After settlement of technical problems connected with exchange rates and methods of transfer, the ICRC received in May 1955 from the Japanese Government the following amounts:

£2,250,000 and
\$6,292,500.

The total collected by then, together with the funds already received from Thailand, amounted to:

£2,696,428/11/5 and
\$7,542,500.

These sums were at once suitably invested, until the ICRC should receive from the national agencies all the necessary facts to determine the number of parties entitled in each of the countries concerned and to calculate the amount of each national share on this basis.

IV. QUALIFICATIONS FOR ENTITLEMENT TO COMPENSATION FROM THE FUND

The ICRC did not wait for receipt of all the funds which were to be made available to it before determining the criteria according to which the funds were to be distributed, taking into account the discretion which the signatory Powers delegated to it in this connection.

In other words, to whom and how were the Japanese assets to be distributed?

Article 16 gives some guidance to the reply to these two questions by specifying "... to indemnify those members of the armed forces of the Allied Powers who suffered undue hardships while prisoners of war of Japan ..."

The qualifying conditions conferring a right to indemnity were therefore, in general,

- membership of an allied army
- captivity, as a member of an allied army, in Japan as a prisoner of war
- subjection to excessive privation during that period of captivity.

1. Beneficiary Powers

The term "Allied Power" is defined in article 25 of the Peace Treaty as follows:

"For the purposes of the present Treaty the Allied Powers shall be the States at war with Japan, or any State which previously formed a part of the territory of a State named in Article 23, ¹ provided that in each case the State concerned has signed and ratified the Treaty. Subject to the provisions of Article 21, ² the present Treaty shall not confer any rights, titles or benefits on any State which is not an Allied Power as herein defined; nor shall any right, title or interest of Japan be deemed to be diminished or prejudiced by any provision of the Treaty in favour of a State which is not an Allied Power as so defined."

This excluded nationals of countries which were not signatories to the treaty and nationals of countries which although signatories had not ratified the treaty.

There was for a long time incertitude about operations due to the fact that two countries, the Philippines and Indonesia, were very late in deciding whether to ratify the treaty or not; the Philippines did so, and Indonesia did not.

This considerably delayed the start of preparatory work in the Philippines and compelled the ICRC to place part of the funds in reserve for former Filipino prisoners of war, without knowing

¹ U.S.A., Australia, Canada, Ceylon, France, Indonesia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Kingdom of the Netherlands, Republic of the Philippines, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

² According to article 21 of the treaty, China and Korea were entitled to benefit from the provisions of some articles in the treaty but not those of article 16.

whether the funds would in fact be paid out to them. The margin of insecurity was large; Filipino former POWs seemed to account for about a quarter of all possible claimants.

In order to determine which of the Allied Powers were to benefit from the provisions of Art. 16, the ICRC requested them several times to inform it if members of their armed forces had been prisoners of war in Japan. The determining factor was membership of the armed forces, not nationality or residence. The Executive Committee, at its second session on 8 October 1953, when laying down the responsibilities of the beneficiary Powers, decided that it was for the Power in whose armed forces a former prisoner of war served at the time of his capture, to see that he receive his share, whatever his nationality and residence. An exception was, however, made in the case of those Powers which acquired their independence after the cessation of hostilities, who should themselves assume the responsibility for the defence of the interests of their nationals.

The last request was in February 1955, asking for replies to be sent before 30 April 1955; it enabled the following list of 14 beneficiary Powers to be drawn up:

Australia	Netherlands
Belgium	New Zealand
Cambodia	Norway
Canada	Pakistan
Chile	Philippines
France	Syria
Great Britain	Vietnam

The United States renounced claims to indemnity for members of its armed forces.

2. The "undue hardships" criterion

When deciding what criteria to adopt to ensure an equitable distribution of the Japanese assets, the ICRC had first to bear in mind the basic Red Cross principles and the intentions of the High Contracting Parties. It also endeavoured to ensure that solutions would be practicable and not delay the compensation operations in a manner incompatible with the objective.

The wording "... those members of the armed forces of the allied Powers who suffered undue hardships..." in Article 16 clearly revealed the intention of the States to individualize compensation. The Parties to the San Francisco Treaty did in fact intend to reach those former prisoners of war who had physically and morally suffered most from their captivity.

The same Parties however did not take into consideration the task facing the national agencies of undertaking—if any differentiation in the degree of suffering from case to case had to be made—thousands of thorough enquiries and then of comparing results. Apart from the difficulty of discounting subjective reactions in the face of such privation, it would have been necessary to set up a sophisticated administrative and medical organization. Such an undertaking would have taken a great deal of time—and there had already been considerable delay since the Treaty came into force—and would have absorbed a large part of the available funds. Consequently, the benefits for claimants would have been less and would have been even further delayed.

Having been entrusted with determining "the basis it deemed equitable" for the compensating of these former prisoners of war, the ICRC brought these considerations to the notice of the beneficiary Powers' Working Group at its first session from 4 to 6 March 1953. The consensus on that occasion was that, to speed up and facilitate the remittance of funds to the national agencies, it would be preferable to assume the following hypothesis as a basis:

"The number of prisoners having suffered excessive privation was proportionally the same in each of the national contingents".

It was therefore decided that each national quota would be directly proportional to the number of prisoners of war in Japanese hands.

Each national agency was therefore to receive the same amount for each prisoner recognized as an eligible claimant. As a result, compensations already paid out by some States to former POWs from Japanese assets abandoned under other provisions of the Peace Treaty were not taken into consideration for the distribution among the national agencies of the funds covered by Article 16:

the other refunds referred to had been forfeited to the States in whose possession they were, without any qualifying condition regarding their utilisation.

3. Membership of an allied army and captivity as a POW.

According to Article 16, the beneficiaries had to be former members of the armed forces of an allied Power and to have suffered internment as prisoners of war in Japanese hands.

These two criteria were also examined by the Working Party during its March 1953 session. Membership of the armed forces was the main problem.

The Working Party decided that the criteria according to Article 16 should be interpreted strictly. Interned civilians and merchant-seamen were therefore not eligible even if they had been interned in the same camps as the POWs. It was also left to the ICRC to decide, in consultation with the governments concerned, whenever doubt arose on the question of membership of the armed forces of the Allied Powers.

Such problems did in effect subsequently occur in several countries due to the very special situations resulting from the war in the Far East and in the Pacific Ocean. Decisions to grant or refuse compensation as provided for under Article 16, in connection with cases raised by a country, were taken as "case law" by other countries where similar cases arose. In this way the ICRC endeavoured to ensure an equitable balance of solutions from case to case with a view to providing treatment which was as far as possible the same for all the former POWs concerned.

The following examples illustrate how the International Committee applied this criterion of membership of the armed forces: it excluded:

- all civilians;
- seamen of the merchant marine;
- the guerrilleros or members of resistance movements who were not members of the regular armed forces at the time of their capture.

It granted the benefits of Article 16 in respect of claims by:

- the United Kingdom, for the Hong Kong Police;
- the Netherlands, for the Mounted Police, the "Stadswachters" and the "Landswachters" demobilised shortly before the capitulation but taken prisoner before the demobilisation orders could reach them or could be carried out;
- France (armed forces in Indochina), for the "Gendarmerie", the "Compagnies républicaines de sécurité", the "Garde républicaine", the "Garde mobile", the "Garde indochinoise", and children who took part in the fighting in Indochina provided they were the children of soldiers.
- the Philippines, for Filipinos of the US land and sea forces ("Philippine Scouts") even for those who had acquired American nationality after their release from captivity;
- India or Pakistan, for East Punjabi moslems whose nationality (Indian or Pakistani) had not been decided.

The prisoner of war criterion, the ICRC decided, excluded claims in respect of members of the armed forces who had been killed in combat or when they were surrendering.

At the suggestion of the Australian Government, however, it was decided that the members of families of former POWs who died in or after captivity should receive the compensation which would have been due to them had the POWs survived. An appreciable part of the compensation funds provided for under Art. 16 was thus paid to the heirs of POWs.

V. LISTING OF FORMER PRISONERS OF WAR ENTITLED TO BENEFIT

The bases for division had thus been clearly defined even before the amount of funds available for distribution was known. However,

the number of claimants in each of the beneficiary countries had also to be determined so that the amount of the share for each individual and, consequently, the sum which the ICRC would have to pay to each of the national agencies, could be calculated.

To carry out the census of former prisoners of war qualifying under the terms of Article 16 and the relevant decisions of the Executive Committee proved to be the most complex of all duties entrusted to the national agencies and the ICRC. It was also the one which required the longest time.

1. Lists submitted by States

Japan had not acceded to the Geneva Convention of 27 July 1929 relating to the treatment of prisoners of war. It was therefore not subject to any formal obligation, as provided for in that Convention, to communicate to the ICRC Central Prisoners of War Agency the names of all enemy military personnel captured during hostilities. It is true that the Government in Tokyo did supply some information to the Central Agency, but those lists were incomplete and quite inadequate to permit the identification of all allied prisoners of war in Japanese hands. Nationals of some countries were not included in those lists and no distinction was made between prisoners of war and interned civilians.

That omission by the Detaining Power could not unfortunately be remedied by information from other sources. ICRC delegates had not been authorized to visit camps regularly, so that a great many prisoners were not covered by the delegates' supervision. Consequently the Central Agency could not supply a full list of prisoners entitled to benefit.

Under these conditions it was for the Powers in whose armed forces the prisoners had served to give their number to the ICRC. The International Committee therefore, on 16 November 1953, asked the States concerned to provide it with lists indicating in respect of each serviceman:

- the name, first name, date and place of birth;
- military unit, rank and number;
- nationality;
- where held captive by the Japanese.

As these lists were a long time forthcoming, the ICRC repeated its appeal four times. In February 1955, that is, when the Japanese funds were about to be transferred to it for distribution among the POWs, it had still not received all final lists. Three States had sent none.

The Executive Committee was informed of this situation and prolonged the deadline for despatch of these lists first to 30 April 1955 and then to 31 May 1955. It decided that thereafter Powers which had not submitted the requisite lists would not be entitled to benefit by the provisions of Article 16. However, a large number of new lists and supplementary lists continued to be received after 31 May 1955. In addition, some countries, including the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, had received further information from Japan which they wished to compare with the lists already drawn up. Part of the Pakistan lists were, moreover, lost between Karachi and Geneva. Several countries had not been able to contact in time all their former prisoners of war to enable them to register.

Under these conditions, the ICRC suggested that the Executive Committee should postpone the final deadline until 30 April 1956. The Executive Committee so decided on 14 March 1956, adding that, consistent with the ICRC proposals, no name submitted after 30 April 1956 could be considered for computation of the amount of the national share. It was also understood at the same time that the ICRC would ask the States to constitute a reserve fund to meet claims of former prisoners of war whose names had not been known or had been omitted at the time the lists were drawn up.

In the meantime, Indonesia decided not to ratify the San Francisco Peace Treaty and was, therefore, no longer one of the Powers to benefit from the provisions of Article 16.

2. ICRC check of lists

The purpose of examining the lists received in Geneva within the time limit prescribed by the Executive Committee was to ensure uniform application of the provisions of Article 16 and thereby to guarantee equality of treatment among all servicemen concerned. For that purpose the ICRC checked that the qualifying criteria had been observed and that names of former prisoners of war had not

been included in the lists of a country more than once or in the lists of several countries.

The check on qualifying criteria, as the lists reached the Central Agency, revealed omissions and inaccuracies in respect of which the ICRC asked the States concerned for clarification.

For example, the list submitted by Australia had opposite some names the words "presumed dead" without indicating whether these persons were servicemen killed in action or dead in captivity.

The Pakistan list mentioned "presumed prisoner of war" which did not make it clear whether the person concerned had been a prisoner of war or not. The nationality was sometimes missing; some of the prisoners of war listed were shown as being of Indian nationality.

The International Committee also compared the lists received from the Allied Powers with the information which the Japanese Government sent it during the war, in order to check that no prisoner of war of whom it had been officially informed by the Detaining Power had been omitted from the lists drawn up by the Powers of which the prisoners were nationals.

The ICRC deemed it expedient furthermore to examine in the countries concerned the documents which had been used for the drawing up of these lists. That examination consisted of spot-checks of all cases whose qualifications appeared doubtful.

In Pakistan, the ICRC delegate had for that purpose to travel some 3,000 miles. In other countries, records were fortunately more centralised.

To check that names did not appear twice in the lists, the ICRC drew up a single alphabetical list for each country which had supplied several lists in order to ensure that there were no repetitions. This proved to be necessary, particularly in respect of lists supplied by the United Kingdom, Pakistan and Vietnam. The IBM punched-card system was used for these verifications. It was also found that some names were included on several lists, such as those of New Zealand nationals on the British and Australian lists, those of Australians on the British lists, and Belgians on the French, British and Netherlands lists. That check showed moreover that nationals of the Grand-Duché of Luxembourg who had been prisoner in Japanese hands had all been members of the French

armed forces. They were shown as such on the French lists; the Grand-Duché was in any case not a Party to the San Francisco treaty.

The various verifications carried out resulted in the elimination of 9,747 names from the lists received by 30 April 1956. At the end of 1956 those lists were final for all the beneficiary Powers except for the Philippines and Vietnam. Subject to adjustment in respect of those two countries they covered a total of 153,933 former prisoners of war in Japanese hands.

3. Philippines.

(a) As has already been pointed out, the Government of the Philippines only decided after a long delay to ratify the Peace Treaty with Japan. The registering of former Philippine prisoners of war was therefore not started until most of the other beneficiary Powers had submitted their lists. In addition, it appeared that the listing of Philippine beneficiaries encountered considerable difficulties so that operations were likely to be protracted.

In order to avoid keeping those former prisoners of war whose claims had already been recognized, in the other countries, waiting unduly, it was decided to distribute the Japanese assets in two phases: the first distribution was to enable compensation to be made to the beneficiaries of the other countries without further delay, after placing a lump-sum in reserve from which the Philippine share would ultimately be drawn. The second distribution would then be made between all the beneficiary Powers from the balance of funds remaining from the reserve earmarked for the Philippines, after determining the exact number of Philippine beneficiaries and paying the national share thus due to the Philippines.

(b) Before reaching this step, the ICRC attempted to come to a compromise solution with the Government of the Philippines with a view to speeding up the remittance of indemnities to the Philippine beneficiaries.

The International Committee had in fact seen that it was not possible to accept, just as they were, as a basis for distribution, the lists which the Philippine authorities had submitted to it and which

contained 66,217 names. After eliminating 6,541 cases given on these lists as "civilians", there only remained 59,676 names; the question was to discover how many of these applied to former prisoners of war fulfilling the conditions of qualification under Article 16.

This checking encountered insurmountable difficulties. Some pages of the manuscript list were illegible, so that it was impossible to verify whether names had not been written down several times over. Furthermore, the same person's name sometimes figured on different lists, either because it had been transcribed in several ways, or else because it was classified under the heading of the first name and elsewhere under the family name.

In these conditions, the Governments of the other beneficiary Powers decided to propose to the Philippine Government an overall reduction of the number of cases on the lists submitted to the ICRC. An International Committee delegate went to Manila in May 1954 when he proposed to take the number of 40,000 men as a basis of calculation for the Philippines' share.

The Government of the Philippines did not accept this proposal. It insisted on maintaining the figure of 60,000, although it declared itself prepared to take every step to draw up lists which could be checked.

(c) The lists of former Philippine prisoners of war had consequently to be drawn up again on other bases.

From the files of the armed forces of the Philippines it was not possible to discover the names of all former Philippine prisoners of war in Japanese hands, with the result that enquiries had to be undertaken in each case. The United States for its part was unable to supply the necessary details for the drawing up of a complete list.

It therefore only remained to contact the beneficiaries themselves. The Red Cross of the Philippines having then been appointed the national agency for the distribution of funds under Article 16, it had henceforward to carry out this heavy task. The ICRC instructed its delegate in Manila to assist the National Red Cross Society in the execution of the mandate entrusted to it.

In April 1957, the Philippine Red Cross sent out an appeal through the press and radio asking all former prisoners of war or

their surviving heirs to register with the local branch of the Red Cross nearest their homes. The individual files thus drawn up for each case and the lists made out on this basis were then sent to the headquarters of the Society which had opened a special section for the compilation of the results of the appeal and to draw up national lists.

Taking into account the difficulties of communication between the capital and the many islands in the archipelago, as well as the illiteracy of a large number of claimants, the date of registration had to be extended until 31 March 1958.

(d) Meanwhile, it was discovered that an appreciable number of Philippine nationals had belonged to the American armed forces during the war, and if the United States Government was entitled to waive for its own nationals claim to benefit from Article 16 of the Treaty of San Francisco, it could not do the same for military personnel having served in its armed forces, but who had Philippine nationality at the time of their captivity.

Former Philippine prisoners of war who had belonged to the "Philippines Scouts" in the land or sea forces of the United States were therefore qualified to benefit from compensation as laid down by Article 16, even if they had since acquired American citizenship.

A further appeal was therefore made to this category of beneficiary. For former prisoners of war resident in the United States, the last appeal was broadcast on 11 January 1959 with an expiry date for registration on 15 March in the same year.

(e) In order to verify the results of these registrations in the Philippines and the United States, the ICRC first of all made checks in the Philippines on the basis of military archives. When information drawn from this source was lacking or was too incomplete, the International Committee based itself on other data, either to establish that the claimant had really undergone war captivity (attestations made by companions in captivity), or for the purpose of showing the existence of ties of relationship between deceased former prisoners of war and claimants. About a third of the beneficiary prisoners had died.

Lists were drawn up in this way by the IBM Agency in Manila.

In the United States, requests for registration submitted by former Philippine prisoners of war having served in American units and resident, some in the Philippines and others in the USA, were sent for verification to the United States Defence Department.

A final check was carried out in Geneva on the basis of an overall list drawn up by IBM in March 1960. These checks established that 44,055 former Philippine prisoners of war could be considered as being beneficiaries. It was on the basis of this figure that the Philippines' share was determined for the first distribution.

(f) In view of the fact that 60,000 shares had been placed in reserve, the 15,945 remaining shares were then available to be distributed, in accordance with the Working Party's decision, to all the beneficiary Powers in proportion to the number of former prisoners of war recognized as being beneficiaries.

In spite of the long delay in drawing up the definite list of Philippine former prisoners of war, a large number asserted their claims after the expiry date of 31 March 1958. The Philippine Red Cross nevertheless accepted their claims for registration and presented additional lists which were subjected to checking similar to that described above. They were in addition compared with the basic list of 44,055 beneficiaries, with a view to discovering possible errors and duplications. When these checks were made, the total number of Philippine beneficiaries amounted definitely to 55,124, and the Philippine Red Cross drew from the national share in the second distribution the necessary funds for the compensation of these late claimants.

In the other countries, the lists had been drawn up by the national authorities and the cost which this work had incurred was defrayed by each of the Powers concerned. Expenses incurred by the ICRC in drawing up and verifying the list of the Philippines were therefore charged against the national share reverting to that country.

4. Vietnam.

Vietnam did not possess documentation capable of serving as a basis for the drawing up of a list of former prisoners of war in

Japanese hands. The beneficiaries were therefore called upon to register individually with the central or local authorities.

At the time of the entry into force of the Peace Treaty of San Francisco, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam only controlled the southern part of the country. Certain regions over which the authorities of South Vietnam still exercised control at the beginning of the operations for the registering of beneficiaries, had passed into the hands of North Vietnam before the definitive list could be drawn up. In these conditions the list submitted to the ICRC showed:—

2,690 registered beneficiaries under the control of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam (South).

525 registered beneficiaries under its control at the time of registration were resident in areas which, since then, had passed under the control of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North).

1,285 beneficiaries as an estimate by the Saigon authorities of persons who had been unable to register because they were resident in the part of the country already controlled by North Vietnam at the time of registration. The list showed no names for these cases.

4,500: Total of the Vietnam list.

The authorities of the Republic of Vietnam proposed that the shares of the prisoners of war resident in North Vietnam should be held in reserve for them.

The problems resultant from such a situation far surpassed the framework of a technical checking of the lists. The ICRC therefore asked the advice of a legal consultant in international law, Prof. P. Guggenheim, with whom it raised the following questions:

(a) Have former POWs, regularly registered on lists by the Saigon authorities, but at present resident in North Vietnam and not therefore able to receive their indemnity from the South Vietnamese Government, acquired a lasting right to such benefit?

(b) Can former POWs not registered on lists by the Saigon Government because they have at all times been resident in a zone

outside its control, be represented by the Hanoi Government as successor in North Vietnam to the Saigon Government and as such bound by the Treaty of San Francisco? If so, should these former prisoners be excluded from benefitting from Article 16, not being registered within the time limits? If this is not the case, is the claim of the Saigon Government that a reserve be constituted justified in law?

On 8 December 1956, Prof. Guggenheim replied to these questions as follows:

(a) Former POWs whose names were transmitted within the prescribed time limits have acquired a lasting right to benefit under Art. 16. Amounts due to them should be held in reserve until they can be distributed.

(b) The Government of North Vietnam cannot be regarded as successor to the Government of South Vietnam. On the other hand, the claim of the Government of South Vietnam asking for the constitution of a reserve to cover the case of former POWs not registered on the lists, because they had at all times been resident in territory outside its control, is justified in law, as the Government had already, on the conclusion and entry into force of the Peace Treaty with Japan, had its claim over the entire territory of Vietnam recognized by the co-signatories. It would therefore seem fitting that a reserve be constituted until its utilization is possible, or until it proved impossible for the Government of South Vietnam to exercise control over the whole of Vietnamese territory, in which case it would lose all rights to the reserve.

On the basis of Prof. Guggenheim's conclusions, the ICRC proposed to the beneficiary States to pay the Republic of Vietnam the share corresponding to the 2,690 former prisoners of war identified by and accessible to the Saigon Government (Vietnam I share), and to hold in reserve the amount earmarked for the 525 beneficiaries who could not be reached (Vietnam II reserve), and for the 1,285 unregistered prisoners of war (Vietnam III reserve).

The Working Party of the beneficiary States, at its meeting on 12 March 1957, gave its agreement to this manner of proceeding.

In December 1959, the situation in Vietnam had not changed. The country was still divided into two States by the provisional demarcation line established by the 1954 armistice agreement.

It was therefore decided that the Vietnam II and Vietnam III reserves would be handed over to the Government of the Republic of Vietnam.

It was, however, understood that the national agency of that country would hold these for five years, distributing during that period the share due from reserve II to beneficiaries presenting themselves in the South, and paying out of the funds of reserve III indemnities to former prisoners of war who, arriving from the North, had not had the opportunity of registering at the time when the lists were drawn up. Should their numbers exceed the 1,285 cases expected on the constituting of the reserve, they should be paid out of the funds of the second distribution.

On the expiry of the 5-year period, funds not utilized would be devoted to a general aid action for former prisoners of war already compensated, or for their dependents. This action would be carried out on the basis of an agreement between the national agency of the Republic of Vietnam and the ICRC.

VI. FUND DISTRIBUTION

1. Share-out among national agencies

When—for the reasons already explained—it appeared necessary to distribute the Japanese assets in two stages, the ICRC examined, in co-operation with the governments of the beneficiary Powers, what sums should be first distributed and how they should be remitted to the claimants.

The International Committee bore the following criteria in mind:

(a) In all countries where the number of former prisoners of war in Japanese hands had been determined definitively, that number should be the basis for deciding the amount of the national share.

(b) In respect of countries where their number had not been finally determined, reserve funds would be set up, taking into account the maximum estimate submitted by the national agencies of those countries. The ICRC would retain those funds until such time as the number had definitively been determined.

(c) With due allowance for the foregoing, the sums earmarked for the first distribution would be as large as possible.

(d) The ICRC having received the Japanese assets half in Pounds Sterling and half in US Dollars, payment of the national shares would also be made in those two currencies.

(e) The individual share would be determined by dividing the total funds entrusted to the ICRC by the total number of former prisoners of war shown on the national lists (including the provisional figures used for computing the reserves). It would then suffice to multiply the individual share thus arrived at by the total number of beneficiaries shown on each national list in order to calculate the amount due to each country.

(f) This initial distribution would not include the interest accumulated since the Japanese assets were made available to the ICRC and invested. It was arranged that the yield on that capital would be allocated to cover the expenditure incurred by the ICRC in the discharge of its mandate. Any balance thereof remaining would be added to the funds for the second distribution, after determination of the Philippines' share in the first distribution.

The Working Party of the beneficiary Powers having given their agreement to this procedure, the ICRC began, in November 1956, to pay out the national shares due under the first distribution.

Total of funds received:	£ 2,696,428/11/5
	and \$ 7,542,500.—
Total of registered prisoners:	
— final national lists	153,933
— Philippines' reserve	60,000
— Vietnam shares I, II and III	4,500
	<hr/>
Total	218,433

Individual share: £ 12/6/10½ + US\$ 34.53

The work carried out by the Philippine Red Cross showed, in 1960, that the figure of 44,055 former prisoners of war could be considered the total for all claimants in that country. Consequently the 15,945 shares remaining from the 60,000 which had been kept in reserve permitted consideration being given to the possibility of a second distribution among all beneficiary Powers. Those shares which became available represented, in round figures:

£ 184,000 and
\$ 512,000.

The interest accumulated up to the time of the first distribution of national shares (1956) was increased, to a more modest degree, thanks to the yield on the reserve fund. After deducting the ICRC's expenses, this interest account showed the following balance:

£ 269,000 and
\$ 440,000.

The total funds available for the second distribution amounted therefore to the following:

Balance of the Philippines reserve—	£ 184,000 + \$ 512,000
Balance on interest account	£ 269,000 + \$ 440,000
Total	£ 453,000 + \$ 952,000

These amounts were paid to the national agencies in 1961 in proportion to the number of claimants in each country, i.e. for each claimant,

about £ 2 and
about \$4.

Attached hereto, as appendix II, is a table showing the first distribution, and as appendix III a table showing the second distribution. Appendix IV shows the available balance as at 31 December 1970.

Part of the assets being represented in Swiss franc accounts, and the expenditure still being incurred by the ICRC for the winding up of the problems in abeyance in some of the beneficiary

countries also being booked in Swiss francs, it is in that currency that the balance is expressed, viz.:

Swiss francs 496,464.65

The ICRC is holding this sum available for the Powers concerned.

2. Payment to claimants

(a) The national agencies had responsibility for the distribution of sums received from the ICRC to former prisoners of war whose claims had been recognized.

When making these payments they were not bound by the uniform value individual share, which was merely a system adopted for computation of the amount of each national share. In other words, each beneficiary Power was free to remit the funds as it deemed fit to the persons who qualified under the terms of the treaty and of the Working Party's decisions. Most did distribute the funds in equal shares. Some, however, endeavoured to individualize the indemnities by adapting them as far as possible to the degree of suffering inflicted on the claimants.

This procedure was adopted, for instance, in the Republic of Vietnam and in France.

In Vietnam it was planned to distribute half of the overall amount equally among all former prisoners. The other half was to be used to pay a supplementary benefit to the heirs of deceased former POWs or to surviving POWs whose captivity had had lasting repercussions. This supplementary indemnity should have amounted to twice, thrice or even four times the amount of the basic indemnity. In the event of there being a balance available after payment of these two distributions, it would be divided among all prisoners in proportion to the length of their captivity.

In France the national share was divided as follows:

- the heirs of POWs who died in captivity received a sum equal to two individual shares;
- surviving POWs suffering from a disability of 80% or more received one and a half shares;
- other former POWs received one share.

This method necessitated the compiling of more complicated individual files than in other countries and it considerably delayed payment to beneficiaries of sums calculated according to this scale. Consequently, it was not until December 1960 that a start was made to the distribution to former French POWs in Japanese hands of the funds paid by the ICRC to the French national agency in January and May 1957.

However, it so happened that the French franc was twice devalued in the meantime and the International Committee expressed the hope that the authorities would take that fact into account when calculating indemnities. This suggestion was not acted upon. Nor did it appear possible to credit claimants with the interest earned by the funds kept in reserve during those four years.

(b) The payment from 1957 on of the first distribution of indemnities revealed two contrasting phenomena:

Except for those countries which claimed for only a few former prisoners of war in Japanese hands, many others found they were unable to reach all claimants included in the lists approved by the ICRC. Some had changed addresses without notifying the national agency and the authorities were unable to trace them. Other claimants had died without descendants. Others omitted to respond to the repeated appeals sent to them or were unable to do so.

When confronted with this problem, the Working Party accepted the suggestion that it invite national agencies to place shares not paid out in the first distribution into a reserve fund for two years, starting on 1 January 1960. It was understood that during those two years the national agencies would take all steps likely to lead to the tracing of claimants who did not collect and to permit the greatest possible number of remittances to be made. At the end of the two years, viz. after 31 December 1961, the balance of any undistributed shares would be added to the funds set aside for the second distribution.

On the other hand, the start of the payments induced a number of former prisoners of war not included on the lists to put forward claims for indemnity. Consequently, in spite of the care taken by the national agencies to draw up lists of the persons intended to benefit from Article 16 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and

although the time limit for that work was several times extended, it became clear that the census had not always been complete. The upheavals of the war, and the difficult circumstances which followed it in most of the countries concerned explained this state of affairs to a great extent. There could be no question of rejecting these late claims and debarring those who submitted them, for by the very fact of their having been prisoners of war in Japanese hands they had acquired a right to the indemnity provided for in Article 16 of the Treaty. On the other hand, the national shares had been calculated on the basis of lists approved by the ICRC. It was no longer possible to change the shares paid out in the first distribution.

The existence of the balance remaining for the second distribution and the funds comprising the shares not paid out during the first distribution fortunately provided the national agencies involved with the means of meeting this unexpected situation.

The supplementary lists which they sent to the ICRC were examined and controlled in the same way as the basic lists.

(c) These changes in the number of claimants were a considerable burden in several countries and a reduction in the relative value of the balance of funds available for the second distribution.

Except in the cases of countries which had only a few former prisoners of war, it could reasonably be asked whether for such small amounts an equal distribution per person was justified or whether it would not be preferable to use the balance for relief limited to those ex-POWs or their heirs who were in the greatest need. Such a procedure would, of course, not benefit all former prisoners whose claims had been duly recognized. At least a more substantial aid could be provided to those in the poorest circumstances.

Faced with the difficulty of finding satisfactory criteria for selection, many countries adopted the first solution, which was undoubtedly also the simplest, at least when distribution was by equal shares. The available balance (funds from the first distribution and undistributed shares of the first distribution, after deduction of indemnities paid to late claimants) was paid out in those countries in individual amounts calculated according to the same principles as for the first distribution.

Other countries, however, chose to attribute the balance of Japanese assets to specific objectives, in the interest of certain categories of former POWs. For instance, Canada, Pakistan, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, in agreement with the ICRC, founded special funds (trust funds) whose use—consistent with the objectives of Article 16 of the Treaty—was specified in byelaws. Sums drawn from these funds were intended to assist those former POWs, or their families, who were in particularly difficult circumstances. They were used, in some cases, to supplement the assistance already being granted by the authorities, such as in the form of housing assistance to elderly, sick or convalescent former POWs, or in the form of scholarships, help to purchase prostheses for disabled former POWs, and so forth.

In the Philippines the national agency adopted a similar solution. After consulting the ICRC, it devoted the balance of funds to the supply of prostheses, wheel-chairs, crutches and spectacles for disabled POWs. It also granted financial aid to some POWs whose state of health demanded medical or surgical treatment. In addition, in some cases it granted allowance for funeral services. This programme was to continue until the funds, plus the interest earned from investments made by the national agency, were exhausted.

A similar solution is now being adopted in the Republic of Vietnam, following agreement between the national agency and the ICRC.

VII. CONCLUSION

The reader of this report cannot fail to be struck by the long lapse of time between the signing of the Peace Treaty at San Francisco and the payment of indemnities to the former prisoners specified in Article 16. The generous intentions expressed in September 1951 by the representatives of the Powers parties to the Treaty were thus, in many cases, put into effect only belatedly; so much so, indeed, that the beneficiaries were often not the persons who had suffered the particularly harsh conditions of wartime captivity, but were their spouses or descendants. The prudent provision for the payment of the indemnities to the families of deceased former prisoners of war was therefore more widely applied than could have been expected at the time the Treaty was signed.

The two main causes of this state of affairs were the problems involved in the collection of the funds to be distributed and the drawing up of the lists of claimants.

The International Committee of the Red Cross avails itself of this opportunity to express its thanks to the authorities and National Red Cross Societies which made a decisive contribution to the solution of those fundamental problems. It is particularly grateful to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom and to the national agencies appointed in each country to apply Article 16 for their understanding and for the support they gave it in the discharge of the mission entrusted to it. In spite of the long time which the beneficiaries had to wait, it was undoubtedly due to these combined efforts that it was possible to carry out the indemnity operations in almost all the countries concerned.

TREATY OF PEACE WITH JAPAN

ARTICLE 14

(a) It is recognized that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war. Nevertheless it is also recognized that the resources of Japan are not presently sufficient, if it is to maintain a viable economy, to make complete reparation for all such damage and suffering and at the same time meet its other obligations.

Therefore,

1. Japan will promptly enter into negotiations with Allied Powers so desiring, whose present territories were occupied by Japanese forces and damaged by Japan, with a view to assisting to compensate those countries for the cost of repairing the damage done, by making available the services of the Japanese people in production, salvaging and other work for the Allied Powers in question. Such arrangements shall avoid the imposition of additional liabilities on other Allied Powers, and, where the manufacturing of raw materials is called for, they shall be supplied by the Allied Powers in question, so as not to throw any foreign exchange burden upon Japan.

2. (I) Subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph (II) below, each of the Allied Powers shall have the right to seize, retain, liquidate or otherwise dispose of all property, rights and interests of

- (a) Japan and Japanese nationals,
- (b) persons acting for or on behalf of Japan or Japanese nationals, and
- (c) entities owned or controlled by Japan or Japanese nationals,

which on the first coming into force of the present Treaty were subject to its jurisdiction. The property, rights and interests specified in this sub-paragraph shall include those now blocked, vested or in the possession or under the control of enemy property authorities of Allied Powers, which belonged to, or were held or managed on behalf of any of the persons or entities mentioned in (a), (b) or (c) above at the time such assets came under the control of such authorities.

(II) The following shall be excepted from the right specified in sub-paragraph (I) above:

- (i) property of Japanese natural persons who during the war resided with the permission of the Government concerned in the territory of one of the Allied Powers, other than territory occupied by Japan, except property subjected to restrictions during the war and not released from such restrictions as of the date of the first coming into force of the present Treaty;

- (ii) all real property, furniture and fixtures owned by the Government of Japan and used for diplomatic or consular purposes, and all personal furniture and furnishings and other private property not of an investment nature which was normally necessary for the carrying out of diplomatic and consular functions, owned by Japanese diplomatic and consular personnel;
- (iii) property belonging to religious bodies or private charitable institutions and used exclusively for religious or charitable purposes;
- (iv) property, rights and interests which have come within its jurisdiction in consequence of the resumption of trade and financial relations subsequent to September 2, 1945, between the country concerned and Japan, except such as have resulted from transactions contrary to the laws of the Allied Power concerned;
- (v) obligations of Japan or Japanese nationals, any right, title or interest in tangible property located in Japan, interests in enterprises organized under the laws of Japan, or any paper evidence thereof; provided that this exception shall only apply to obligations of Japan and its nationals expressed in Japanese currency.

(III) Property referred to in exceptions (i) through (v) above shall be returned subject to reasonable expenses for its preservation and administration. If any such property has been liquidated the proceeds shall be returned instead.

(IV) The right to seize, retain, liquidate or otherwise dispose of property as provided in sub-paragraph (I) above shall be exercised in accordance with the laws of the Allied Power concerned, and the owner shall have only such rights as may be given him by those laws.

(V) The Allied Powers agree to deal with Japanese trademarks and literary and artistic property rights on a basis as favorable to Japan as circumstances ruling in each country will permit.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the Allied Powers waive all reparations claims of the Allied Powers, other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war, and claims of the Allied Powers for direct military costs of occupation.

TABLE OF FIRST DISTRIBUTION

Country	Claimants	Amount allocated per country	
		£	\$
Australia	22,415	276,685. 3. 1	773,989.95
Belgium	3	37. 0. 7	103.59
Cambodia	42	518. 8. 9	1,450.26
Canada	1,737	21,441. 1.10	59,978.61
Chile	1	12. 6.10	34.53
France	10,442	128,893. 8. 8	360,562.26
Norway	4	49. 7. 6	138.12
New Zealand	119	1,468.18. 1	4,109.07
Pakistan	19,872	245,285. 0. 0	686,180.16
Netherlands	42,233	521,313.11.10	1,458,305.49
Philippines	44,055	543,803.18. 1	1,521,219.15
United Kingdom	58,175	718,097.13. 1	2,008,782.75
Syria	1	12. 6.10	34.53
Vietnam	4,500	Part VN I:	Part VN I:
		33,204.13.09	92,885.70
		Part VN II:	Part VN II:
		6,480. 9. 4	18,128.25
		Part VN III:	Part VN III:
15,861.14. 4	44,371.05		
		2,513,165. 2. 7	7,030,273.47

TABLE OF SECOND DISTRIBUTION

Country	Claimants	Amount allocated per country	
		£	\$
Australia	22,415	43,050	91,400
Belgium	3	6	12
Cambodia	42	80	170
Canada	1,737	3,340	7,100
Chile	1	1.17. 0	3.80
France	10,442	20,050	42,500
Norway	4	8. 0. 0	16
New Zealand	119	230	500
Pakistan	19,872	38,200	81,000
Netherlands	42,233	81,150	172,000
Philippines	44,055	143,000	295,000
United Kingdom	58,175	111,750	237,000
Syria	1	2	4
Vietnam	4,500	Part VN I:	Part VN I:
		11,810	24,800
		452,677.17. 0	951,505.80

ANNEX IV

SITUATION AS AT 31.12.1970

	S. Fr.	S. Fr.
<i>Amounts received</i>		
£2,696,428.11.5 at 12.18		32,842,500.—
\$7,542,500.— at 4.35		32,809,875.—
		65,652,375.—
<i>Plus:</i>		
Accumulated interest	6,656,082.85	
<i>Less:</i>		
Drawn as part payment of ICRC overheads	908,169.65	5,747,913.20
		71,400,288.20
<i>Amounts distributed</i>		
£2,965,842.19.7 at 12.18		36,123,967.50
\$7,981,779.27 at 4.35		34,720,739.80
		70,844,707.30
<i>Plus:</i>		
Bank balances at 31.12.1970		555,580.90
		71,400,288.20
<i>Details of bank balances at 31.12.1970</i>		
	\$	
c/c Swiss Bank Corp., London	99,836.34	430,294.60
c/c Swiss Corp. for Canadian Inv.	659.80	2,843.70
Swiss Corp. for Canadian Inv., on time deposit maturing 12.2.1971	28,000.—	120,680.—
c/c SBS Swiss franc account		1,762.60
		555,580.90
<i>Available balance</i>		
Cash in bank at 31.12.1970		555,580.90
<i>Less:</i>	S. Fr.	
Expenses to be refunded to ICRC as at 31.12.1970	48,616.25	
Estimated additional expenses arising in 1971 (editing and submission of report to Working Party)	10,500.—	59,116.25
<i>Net balance after refund of above expenses to ICRC</i>		496,464.65

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